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Choice of Tort Law in Enclaves
Established by United States
Corporations for Expatriate Employees
By WADE F. HYDER
Member of the Class of 1988
j77here are things that might surprise you about our lives here.
Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 20 n. 11, Levine v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., No. 86-7041 (2d Cir. Apr. 9, 1986), quoting Aramco
advertisement.
I. INTRODUCTION
When individuals agree to take jobs that require relocation abroad
to a United States corporation's special enclave' for employees, they may
be accepting more than just a position of employment. If such employees
become involved in civil disputes, they may be quite surprised and disap-
pointed by the resolution of their cases when the question of applicable
rules of conduct is presented to courts in the United States.
When there is a clash between the laws of two jurisdictions, tradi-
tional conflict of law rules favor the law of the jurisdiction where a tort
allegedly has occurred.2 In the context of the overseas operations of
modem multinational corporations, the application of these rules may
result in decisions that effectively allow defendants to engage in tortious
conduct without fear of adverse consequences. This is because, in na-
tions in which special enclaves of expatriate employees are located, the
laws often afford tort victims no viable remedy'
To define individual rights and duties a court must first ascertain
which jurisdiction's law should govern tort liability in the enclaves. Un-
fortunately, a trial judge may find prior adjudications of this issue un-
1. The enclaves are discussed infra notes 13-25 and accompanying text.
2. This is commonly referred to as lex loci delictus. This concept is discussed infra notes
57-74.
3. See generally Statement of Saudi Arab Law at 13-20, Levine v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
No. 84 Civ. 2396 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 1985) (WESTLAW, Federal library, Alifeds file).
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helpful because United States courts have not perfected a consistent
approach to the choice of law problem. While most courts ultimately
have concluded that the law of the jurisdiction where an alleged tort oc-
curred should prevail,4 some courts have found it more reasonable to
apply United States law to disputes arising from conduct occurring
within the enclaves.5 The conflict in the courts underscores the difficulty
of ascertaining which jurisdiction's law should govern tort liability and of
defining individual rights and duties in the enclaves.
Confusion regarding the source and nature of basic rules of conduct
runs contrary to a fundamental notion underlying Western law-that the
law should be discoverable so that individuals can conduct themselves in
accordance with its principles.6 The theory is that when rules of conduct
are discoverable, an individual abiding by those rules can rest assured
that she has incurred no liability in relations with others. A corollary to
this theory is that the same obligation to conform conduct to a known
standard will apply to others.7 This Note will argue that when Ameri-
cans are before a United States court to litigate disputes arising in these
special enclaves, the court should apply American principles of tort lia-
bility to resolve the disputes.
Laws grounded in a religion that emphasizes sacred principles8 in-
4. 'See Levine, No. 84 Civ. 2396, slip op. at 18; Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d
541, 542 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956); Memorandum and Order at 13,
McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., No. 85 Civ. 2983 (N.D. Cal. order entered Apr. 11, 1986),
5. Harding v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., No. 80-3847 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1985).
6. For more expansive treatment of this concept of legal philosophy, see O.W. HOLMPS,
THE COMMON LAW Lecture I (1881); Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortlious Acts: Its 1history, 7
HARV. L. REV. 315 (1894); Ames, Law andMorals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 105 (1908); Isaacs,
Fault and Liability, 31 HARV. L. REv. 954, 965 (1908).
7. An observer of American jurisprudence may argue that such an expectation is inher-
ently unreliable because the evolving nature of tort law prevents rules of conduct from ever
becoming truly discoverable prior to adjudication of specific claims, This position bears obvi-
ous merit because courts continually do make and change law. The argument, however, has
only a slight impact on the discussion of the situation in the enclaves, where the question is not
whether reliance upon a specific principle of tort law is valid, but whether any principle of
Western tort law may be relied upon.
8. Dr. Saba Habachy explains that:
The Shari'a is the common law of various Islamic countries, including Saudi
Arabia. The Shari'a is a sacred law derived from the revelations given to the Prophet
Mohammed as set forth in the Qur'an and from the tradition of the Prophet (his
practices and sayings) collected in the Books of Hadith. There are four schools of
Sunni Islamic law. Saudi Arabia adheres to the School of Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal,
which follows a strict interpretation of the Qur'an and Hadith. The Qur'an, the
Hadith, and the books and treatises of the Hanbali school are thus the primary
sources of the law in Saudi Arabia.... The King of Saudi Arabia from time to time
issues decrees which supplement the Shari'a and address modern situations not ex-
pressly addressed by the Qur'an and Hadith. These decrees, which constitute posi.
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volving punishment by either the state as a crime or the divine as a sin do
not protect rights in the same manner as laws based upon such concepts
as, for example, compulsory redistribution of wealth between private par-
ties.9 The divergence between such systems of law demonstrates the
great consequences of the decision on the confficts question. Applying
tort principles such as those of Islamic common law results in an inad-
vertent grant of immunity to a defendant and an effective foreclosure of
remedies to a plaintiff'0 whose claim would have warranted compensa-
tion had American tort law been applied to the case.
This Note uses Saudi Arabian law as a paradigm of religion-based
jurisprudence. This jurisdiction is a useful focus for analysis both be-
cause scholarship on principles of Islamic law operative in Saudi Arabia
is so well-developed" and because involvement by United States corpora-
tions in that country has been so extensive.1 2
This Note first examines the nature of an enclave of expatriates in a
foreign nation to show the context in which this legal question arises.
Then, focus shifts to the problem of determining standards for the adju-
dication of claims of harmful misconduct arising out of relations within
the enclaves. This section will review some of the differences between the
principles of substantive law in America and Saudi Arabia. Next, various
tive and not divine law, may not in any way conflict with or change the principles set
forth in the Qur'an and Hadith. One example of regulations issued pursuant to royal
decree is the Saudi Arab Labor and Workmen Law which governs employment rela-
tionships in Saudi Arabia.
Statement of Saudi Arab Law at 6, Levine, No. 84 Civ. 2396 (WESTLAW, Federal library,
Alifeds file).
9. In Western jurisprudence, a tortfeasor is compelled by judicial order to distribute
wealth to a victim to achieve rough compensation for injury caused. Isaacs, supra note 6, at
965-66.
10. See generally Statement of Saudi Arab Law at 14-20, Levine, No. 84 Civ. 2396.
11. See eg., supra note 8.
12. In Chadwick v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 656 F. Supp. 857, 858-59 (D. Del. 1987), the
court provided a succinct history of Arabian American Oil Company's involvement in Saudi
Arabia:
Founded in 1933, as a vehicle to compete with the other Great Powers for stra-
tegic Middle Eastern oil resources, the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco)
explores, produces, refines and sells oil in Saudi Arabia. Aramco remains a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. In 1980,
the Saudi Arabian government acquired beneficial title to Aramco's assets, facilities,
and its concession while Aramco retained legal title. Although Aramco now man-
ages its assets for the Saudi government, legal and equitable title to Saudi Arabian
real estate remains with the Saudi government. Although Aramco is a Delaware
corporation, it transacts no business in the United States and its headquarters remain
in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Aramco maintains an office in Washington D.C. to sus-
tain relations with the State Department, diplomatic missions and various interna-
tional institutions.
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solutions adopted to address the problem of the choice of law question in
these enclaves will be reviewed. Finally, this Note will evaluate the
adopted solutions and suggest a revised policy for determining tort liabil-
ity in the enclaves.
II. THE ENCLAVES
United States corporations have established enclaves to accommo-
date their employees living abroad who are citizens of the United States,
Great Britain, Canada, and many other nations. 13 These enclaves pro-
13. This Note does not consider the viability of the enclaves as communities. Likewise,
the propriety of this or any form of large-scale inhabitation of a developing nation is not ad-
dressed. Rather, the existence of the U.S. corporation and the Western enclave in a host coun-
try are presupposed, and the discussion focuses on how to determine tort liability in light of
that presence. The following list of nations represented in the enclave of Dhahran, Saudi Ara-
bia gives the number of resident employees coming from each nation in 1985. Note that the
American, British, and Canadian citizens together account for 3607 of the total number of
5222, or approximately 70% of the employee residents of Dhahran. This list was submitted to
the court in McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., No. 85 Civ. 2983 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1986).
DHAHRAN FAMILY CAMP EMPLOYEES
Nationality
Australia 5
Bahrain 1
Bangladesh 3
Belgium 1
Canada 142
Central & South America/Caribbean 4
Ceylon (Sri Lanka) 17
Colombia 5
Egypt 46
Finland 1
France 1
Germany (Federal Republic) 3
Great Britain (incl. Northern Ireland) 867
Guyana I
India 138
Indonesia I
Iraq 2
Ireland/Eire 80
Italy 2
Jordan 128
Lebanon 1l1
Malaysia
Netherlands 21
New Zealand 4
Nigeria 2
Pakistan 81
Palestine (All) 2
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vide a special community that is technically within the boundaries of the
host country, but functionally within the cultural expectations of the ex-
patriates. In these enclaves, expatriates are largely isolated from the cul-
ture dominant in the host country. As discussed below,1 4 the distinction
between life in the enclaves and life in the mainstream of the society of
the host country is vital to the definition of the enclaves as distinct
entities.
In recognition of the unique status of enclave residents, multina-
tional corporations and host countries have endeavored to develop cer-
tain understandings about how various legal matters will be decided.
Unfortunately, the operative relationships in each country can be deter-
mined oniy to a limited extent by examining explicit policy statements.
Because of the delicate nature of the political, economic, and even reli-
gious issues that frequently are involved, many agreements and under-
standings are never recorded and thus are not available for review. One
Philippines 349
Republic of China (Taiwan) I
Republic of South Africa I
Saudi Arabia 544
Singapore I
Sudan 21
Switzerland 1
Syria 10
Trinidad 3
Turkey 19
Uganda I
United States of America 2598
Venezuela 1
Yemen 2
Total 5222
One characteristic shared by virtually all expatriate residents of the enclaves is the fact
that the corporation for which they work considers their employment necessary to effectuate
the arrangements it has reached with the host country. The expatriates are thus necessary to
the fulfillment of existent policies of the host country itself. From the point of view of a host
country, the presence of Western corporations enables it to utilize its natural resources and
maximize its economic wealth. Articles 1, 2, and 22 of the Concession Agreement of 1933, see
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
at 3 n.2, Levine v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., No. 84 Civ. 2396 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 1985), attest to
just such a conclusion. This policy statement explicitly includes the caveat that foreign corpo-
rations operating in the host country shall be staffed by nationals of the host country whenever
possible. The Concession Agreement of 1933 required Aramco to "employ Saudi Arab nation-
als as far as practicable, and insofar as the Company can find suitable Saudi Arab employees it
will not employ other nationals." Preliminary Statement of Defendants-Appellees at 42, Le-
vine, No. 86-7041 (2d Cir. Mar. 27, 1986). Consequently, the very presence of nationals of
other countries frequently demonstrates the necessity of their employment.
14. See infra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
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arrangement that often is made explicit by the host country is that sepa-
rate dwelling compounds be developed for employees who are foreign
nationals. For example, in Saudi Arabia, as of March 1977, foreign in-
vestors with contracts exceeding 100 million Saudi riyals'5 are no longer
allowed to rent within city limits and are required to build accommoda-
tions for their employees on previously undeveloped land. 6
As a result of such edicts, the lifestyle in the compounds is very
American. Dhahran, Saudi Arabia is the oldest of the enclaves and now
has spawned third-generation expatriate Aramco employees. A recent
history of modem Saudi Arabia describes Dhahran as follows:
Aramco's oil town on the hill at Dhahran looks like a cover from the
Saturday Evening Post. There are neat white weather board houses,
gauzed porches and pitched red roofs, sprinklers play on the lawns,
mowers chatter across the verges, and the yellow school buses never
fail to halt at the crossing signs. There are oleander hedges, barbecue
pits, soda fountains and baseball bleachers. Visitors often comment
that this leafy, ordered suburb could be Main Street, U.S.A....
You can very easily live inside Aramco's Dhahran township and
never realize you are in the Kingdom. 17
The American residents of Dhahran have never been required to
comply with all of the various Moslem laws of Saudi Arabia."8 These
exemptions have never been specified in writing, but were created orally
by the King of Saudi Arabia. 9 Within the enclaves, residents observe
American customs and practices that are directly cdntrary to Saudi law
outside the compound. These practices include purchasing and consum-
ing pork; driving of automobiles by women; mixing of the sexes in
schools, swimming, and other recreational facilities; viewing American
movies; wearing Western-style dress; and conducting Christian and Jew-
ish religious services.2 0
The treatment of the production, acquisition, and constumption of
alcoholic beverages is instructive as a means of understanding the rela-
15. At the November 1986 exchange rate of USS.2667 per Saudi riyal, 100 million riyals
are worth approximately US$27 million. See BANK & RECORD, Dec. 1986, at 223.
16. PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN SAUDI ARABIA 4 (1979).
17. R. LACEY, THE KINGDOM: ARABIAN HOUSE OF SA'ID 388 (1983), cited in Plaintiff's
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Aralnco's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 16-17, McGhee, No. 85 Civ. 2983.
18. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment at 11-12, Levine v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., No. 84 Civ. 2396 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 1985)
(WESTLAW, Federal library, Allfeds file).
19. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 11, Levine, No. 86-7041 (2d Cir. Apr. 9, 1986)
(statement of John Kelberer, Chief Executive Officer of Aramco).
20. Id. at 10.
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tionship between the explicit domestic policy determinations of a sover-
eign and the often conflicting circumstances in an enclave. Prior to 1950,
Saudi Arabia recognized an unwritten but complete exception to the Is-
lamic prohibition against alcohol for Aramco's employees in Dhahran.2"
The rule was changed in 1950 or 1951. The new rule prohibiting the
importation of alcohol has remained in force since 1951.
No similar prohibition has ever been made on the consumption of
alcohol within the compound.22 The expatriate employees still serve al-
cohol in their homes, and no company policy controls that practice or
attempts to hide it from Saudi authorities.23 Company policy appears, to
the contrary, to endorse consumption of alcohol: alcoholic beverages are
frequently served at company parties, corporations have houses built for
employees with a room specifically intended for the placement of the still,
and corporation-operated special-order stores sell and deliver parapher-
nalia necessary for the production of alcoholic beverages. 24
I. THE CHOICE OF TORT LAW QUESTION
Allegations of damage caused to one person by another in an en-
clave trigger an inquiry into rights and duties.2 5 Out of this inquiry arise
questions concerning the source of the standards of conduct that control
in these planned communities. Judicial attempts to eliminate the uncer-
tainty of ascertaining which jurisdiction's law should govern tort liability
within the enclaves have taken a variety of forms. These attempts have
brought more uncertainty to the choice of law question.
The choice of law issue is acute. A decision in favor of one jurisdic-
21. Id at 11-12.
22. Id at 11, 13.
23. Id at 12-13.
24. Id.
25. The majority of cases presenting this problem has involved individuals suing their
former employers for damages in tort. The analysis conducted in addressing the choice of tort
law in the context of disputes between parties who at one time maintained an employer-em-
ployee relationship, however, is relevant to any consideration of the choice of tort law in dis-
putes arising out of events within the enclaves. Claims based upon the employment
relationship itself are contract claims, and the court's decision regarding the source of law for
adjudication of those disputes is generally controlled by explicit choice of law provisions in the
employment contract. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. When the defendant is not a
former employer, the inequity of allowing a party first to cultivate expectations of a certain
experience and later to disavow having done so, see, eg., infra notes 86-93 and accompanying
text, is clearly absent. Nonetheless, the forum's interest in having its law applied to the con-
duct of its citizens, the complaining parties' expectations regarding the source of rights and
duties, and the inequity of allowing deleterious conduct with impunity may remain significant
whether or not the defendant is a former employer-provided the forum has jurisdiction over
the parties and the dispute.
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tion's laws may spell an end to the litigation, while it decision in favor of
the laws of another jurisdiction could allow the case to be taken to the
trier of fact. Principles of tort law vary greatly from jurisdiction to juris-
diction. 6 A comparison of the requirements for establishing civil liabil-
ity under the tort law of many United States jurisdictions with those in a
system of law like that of Saudi Arabia reveals the enormous differences
in the principles of tort law among different jurisdictions.
Dr. Saba Habachy provided the following uncontested Statement of
Saudi Arab Law while testifying as an expert in recent litigation:
Islamic law, as applied in Saudi Arabia, has no general theory of liabil-
ity for acts which cause damage to another. Damages for injury to the
person or property can only be claimed in those cases in which the
Shari'a specifically recognizes a private right of action in the victim. In
other words, there is no general substantive rule of liability for dam-
age; there are instead particular causes of action in certain determined
cases.
27
In addition to the absence of a general substantive rule of liability
for damages, Islamic tort law does not allow recovery of money damages
in the event of personal injury that is considered "moral injury" only. 28
Actual physical injury-permanent disfigurement of the person or depri-
vation of the use of a limb or an organ-is required before personal in-
jury damages will be awarded.29
Further distinctions between the substance of Western and Saudi
Arabian tort law appear upon examination of limitations on the class of
persons who may be required to appear as defendants in Saudi Arabia.
The law's nonrecognition of any principle equivalent to the doctrine of
respondeat superior reflects the historical absence of the corporate person
from Saudi culture: "The Shari'a has a strict rule that responsibility for
human action is individual and that there can be no vicarious liability." 0
26. See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
27. Statement of Saudi Arab Law at 17, Levine, No. 84 Civ. 2396.
28. Id. at 15-16 (citing S. MAHMASSANI, 1 THE GENERAL THEORY OP THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS UNDER MOHAMMADAN JURISPRUDENCE 171-72 (1935),
SHIEKH ALY AL-KHAFEEF, INDEMNIFICATION IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 54-55 (1973)),
29. See Affadavit of Saba Habachy in Support of Aramco's Motion for Summary Adjudi.
cation of Issues: Choice of Law at 6 n.2, Peebles v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., No. 82 Civ. 0827
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1983) (citing IBN KUDAMA, 9 AL-MUGHN! 54-55 (650 AD.)).
30. Statement of Saudi Arab Law at 15-16, Levine, No. 84 Civ. 2396 (citing WA LA
TAZIR WA-ZIRATUN WIZRA OKHRA: SURAS 6:164; 17:15; 35:18; 39:7). "The Qur'an olten
repeats that no person may be made to answer for the deed of another person." Second State-
ment of Saudi Arab Law at 3, Levine, No. 84 Civ. 2396 (citing S. MAHMASSANI, supra note 28,
at 171).
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In Chadwick v. Arabian American Oil Company,'1 the court concluded as
follows:
This case is governed by what the Angel Gabriel said to the
Prophet Mohammad in the Seventh Century A.D.
In this diversity action, plaintiff has filed a complaint seeking
damages for the alleged medical malpractice of defendant, Arabian
American Oil Company ("Aramco"). Under Delaware choice of law
rules, Saudi Arabian law applies because that country was the locus of
the injury in question. Saudi Arabian law, known as the Shari'a and
revealed to the Prophet Mohammad centuries ago, does not recognize
the doctrine of vicarious liability which is the cornerstone of plaintiff's
medical malpractice theory. For this reason, the Court will grant de-
fendant's motion to dismiss under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure]
12(b)(6).32
The Chadwick court acknowledged that the law applicable in the
1987 case was the same law that applied in the seventh century A.D.
Applying Delaware's choice of law rule that the place of the injury con-
trols resolution of the tort claims, the court was compelled to dismiss the
claim against Aramco upon determining that vicarious responsibility was
not present in Saudi Arabian jurisprudence. Bound by its obligation to
follow the substantive law of the forum state under Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins (including its choice of law rules under Klaxon v. Stentor Elec-
tric Manufacturing Company)3" the Chadwick court was powerless to
consider the equities of applying to a corporation a rule of law that stems
from a time hundreds of years before the corporation was even developed
as an entity.
IV. SOLUTIONS ADDRESSED TO THE CHOICE OF
LAW PROBLEM
A. The "Most Significant Relationship" Test
In In re "'Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation,3 4 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York engaged in a
comprehensive review of various conflicts tests. The court described sec-
tion 6 of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws as setting forth "the
general principles to be applied by a court in deciding what substantive
31. 656 F. Supp. 857 (D. Del. 1987).
32. Id at 858.
33. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
34. 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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law governs."' 35 That section provides as follows:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statu-
tory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice
of the applicable rules of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular
issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.36
The court described when the policies behind a forum's substantive
law should be given consideration in the conflicts analysis. The court
explained that these policies should be considered when the forum has
some interest in the case independent of the mere fact that it is the forum
and distinguished:
".. . the forum [that] has no interest in the case apart from the fact
that it is the place of the trial of the action," from "the forum [that]
has an interest in the case apart from the fact that it is the place of the
trial." In the former, the policies behind the substantive law of the
forum will be irrelevant.... For those cases in which parties do have a
significant contact with the forum such as the residence, place of busi-
ness or state of incorporation of the parties, the policies behind the
substantive laws must be considered.37
In attempting to resolve the choice of law question before it, the Agent
Orange court explained that the choice of law decision "requires a com-
prehensive analysis of many interlocking local and national policies
whenever a new problem is posed."3
The court stated that section 145 of the Second Restatement of Con-
flict of Laws contains the specific list of "factors to be considered when
applying the principles of section 6 to a tort case."'39 According to the
court, these factors "include a wide array of relationships of the parties
35. Id. at 700.
36. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6).
37. Id. at 701 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6).
38. Id. at 700.
39. Id.
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and their contacts with various jurisdictions."'  Under section 145:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in
tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to
that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and
the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6
to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative im-
portance with respect to the particular issue.
4 1
This Restatement section provides an account of what has become
known as the "most significant relationship" test. The "most significant
relationship" test enjoys widespread application and has assumed a posi-
tion of great importance in conflicts law. The New York,42 New
Jersey,43 and Texas" state courts and the Third and Fifth Circuits45 have
each recognized the test.
These jurisdictions have abandoned the traditional choice of law
rule in tort cases, that the law of the place where the wrong occurred
governs. They instead look to the law of the jurisdiction having the most
significant relationship and closest contacts with the parties and the oc-
currence of the wrong.
The "most significant relationship" test requires subtle analysis that
considers the interplay between sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement.
The Agent Orange court cautions that in viewing the contacts used in
conducting the test described in section 145, it is vital to remember that
"[w]hile individual factors must be analyzed, 'the most significant rela-
tionship' analysis should not turn on the number of contacts but more
importantly on the qualitative nature of those contacts as affected by the
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145).
42. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 190, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985).
43. Rose v. Port Auth. of New York, 61 NJ. 129, 139-40, 293 A.2d 371, 376 (1972).
44. Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. 1979).
45. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424, 429 (3d Cir. 1982); Crim v.
International Harvester Co., 646 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1981); Smith v. General Motors Corp.,
382 F. Supp 766, 768-69 (N.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd, 526 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Henry
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F,2d 28, 32 (3d Cir. 1975).
1987]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
policy factors enumerated in Section 6. "146
B. The "Governmental Interest" Test
California courts have developed a "governmental interest" ap-
proach to analysis of choice of law problems. For many years California
followed the rule that its courts should apply the law of the place where a
tort occurred even when this law differed from California's law.47 This
rule was overturned in the landmark case of Reich v. Purcell.4 8 In this
case the California Supreme Court held that the "forum must search to
find the proper law to apply based upon the interests of the litigants and
the involved states." 49 The court concluded that "the law of the place of
the wrong is not necessarily the applicable law for all tort actions
brought in the courts of this state."5
Reich and its progeny developed a choice of law doctrine based
upon a "governmental interest" analysis.51 Before making a choice of
law, a court must consider the actual stake that the potentially concerned
states have in the litigation.52
The governmental interest approach also requires a court to con-
sider "whether the public policy of a particular legislature would be fur-
thered, frustrated or is irrelevant if applied in the case at bar."' 53 The
preference is to apply California law; if, however, the foreign state has a
strong interest in the application of its own law, the court must compare
the impairment caused to each state's interest by the choice of one rule
over the other.54 The law of the forum will be displaced only if the policy
of the legislature of another forum has a stronger interest. 55
46. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 700 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(citing Gutierrez, 583 S.W.2d at 319 ). Note that both theAgent Orange court and the Restate-
ment itself are careful in emphasizing that section 145 is to be understood in relation to the
factors enumerated in section 6.
47. Memorandum in Support of Choice of Law Order at 7, Harding v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., No. 80-3847 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1985).
48. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
49. Id. at 553, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
50. Id. at 555, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
51. See Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974); Strassberg
v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 575 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1978); Cable v. Sahara Tahoe, 93
Cal. App. 3d 384, 155 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1979); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 128
Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976).
52. Strassberg, 575 F.2d at 1264.
53. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 706 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
54. Roesgen v. American Home Prods. Corp., 719 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1983).
55. See Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKIV L.J.
171; Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Refor-
mulation, 25 UCLA L. Rav. 181 (1977).
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The precise analysis to be employed when following the governmen-
tal interest test was detailed in Harding '. Arabian American Oil
Company:
This analysis requires examination of the allegedly applicable laws
to determine if there is a conflict between them. A conflict exists when
two different jurisdictions each have a governmental interest in apply-
ing their laws to a particular situation and their laws are materially
different. A conflict does not exist if the laws are merely different, but
only when the laws are different and the different jurisdictions each
have a reason to see their laws enforced.56
C. Lex Loci Delictus
Among the several solutions courts have proposed in answer to the
choice of law question in the enclaves, the traditional conflicts of law
test-lex loci delictus-has maintained a position of importance. Accord-
ing to section 377 of the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws, which
embodies the lex loci approach, the law of "the place of the wrong" gen-
erally should be the law applied. In the case of a tort claim involving a
personal injury, for example, the "place of the wrong" is defined as "the
place where the harmful force takes effect upon the body."5"
Many states continue to follow the lex loci approach. Michigan, for
instance, looks to the place of the injury to determine if there is a cause of
action for injury to the person or property.59 Similarly, Delaware's
choice of law rule for tort claims requires a Delaware court (or a United
States district court sitting in diversity) to apply the substantive law of
the place where the tort arose.'
A jurisdiction may depart from its commitment to a particular
choice of law test in individual cases. The Agent Orange court, for exam-
ple, explained that the fact that a state uses the lex loci approach in most
cases does not mean that it is immune to arguments based on the relative
interests of jurisdictions. 61 A court that has aligned itself with the lex
loci test may depart from that test when it is successfully argued that a
particular jurisdiction's connection with the controversy is sufficient to
56. Memorandum in Support of Choice of Law Order at 7-9, 12, Harding v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., No. 80-3847 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1985).
57. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377.
58. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 707 (quoting RESTATE-
MENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 note 1).
59. See Parets v. Eaton Corp., 479 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
60. Dawson v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 593 F. Supp. 20 (D. Del. 1984); Fri-
day v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594, 595 (Del. 1965).
61. Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 708.
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justify displacing the rule of lex loci delictus.62
Another modification of the rule applies in cases in which a jurisdic-
tion's law is so uncivilized or undeveloped that it is considered no viable
law at all.63 The judiciary, however, is reluctant to appear to endorse the
position that a legal system is uncivilized or rife with religious discrimi-
nation, possibly because of concerns with comity. Justice Holmes
drafted opinions in Slater,' American Banana C(ompany,65 and Cuba
Railroad Company66 that recognized exceptions to the lex loci delictus
rule in rare cases having unspecified "exceptional circumstances. '" 67
Perhaps the best explanation for the apparent widespread use of the
lex loci test is the development of specific exceptions to the governmental
interest and most significant relationship tests, which provide that in cir-
cumstances when "the rightness or wrongness" of the defendant's con-
duct is at issue, a court should essentially avoid any balancing tests and
automatically conclude that the law of the place where the conduct oc-
curred should govern.68 For example, the court in Babcock v. Jackson 69
stated that:
Where the defendant's exercise of due care in the operation of his
automobile is in issue, the jurisdiction in which the allegedly wrongful
conduct occurred will usually have a predominant, if not exclusive,
concern. In such a case, it is appropriate to look to the law of the place
of the tort so as to give effect to that jurisdiction's interest in regulating
conduct within its borders, and it would be almost unthinkable to seek
the applicable rule in the law of some other place.70
This reasoning was echoed in the recent case of McGhee v. Arabian
American Oil Company, in which the court decided against applying Cal-
ifornia law, stating that it felt the correctness of its position was "particu-
larly true when the rightness or wrongness of the defendant's conduct is
62. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 129, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 71 (1972). Walton v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
63. See Walton, 233 F.2d at 545.
64. Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 129 (1903).
65. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1908).
66. Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 478 (1912).
67. Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 545 n.14 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 872 (1956) (citing American Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 356); V. DICEY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 805 (6th ed. 1949).
68. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749 (1963) (quoting RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379[1]).
69. Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 483, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
70. Id. at 483, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51.
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at issue."' 71 The McGhee court quotes the conclusion in Hernandez v.
Burger that "[i]ndeed, with respect to regulating or affecting conduct
within its borders, the place of the wrong has the predominant
interest. 72
The lex loci approach is also followed despite a jurisdiction's adop-
tion of a balancing test when the interest analysis does not point directly
to the law of any jurisdiction.73 In the event that no clear "winner" ex-
ists in the competition of interests, the law of the place where the tort
occurred prevails.74
D. Individual Cases
In Walton v. Arabian American Oil Company,75 the plaintiff was in-
jured when he was hit by an Aramco vehicle during his brief stay in
Saudi Arabia. The court dismissed the claim for damages in tort because
of the plaintiff's failure to prove the content of Saudi Arabian law.76 The
Walton court explained that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that a
right of recovery was recognized under Saudi Arabian law because the
New York courts at that time followed the lex loci choice of law rule."
The court stated that the lex loci approach "is often said to be based on
the motion [sic] that to hold otherwise would be to interfere with the
authority of the foreign sovereign."73 In a footnote, the court explained
that:
[A] variant but related notion is that the foreign sovereign alone has
the power to create a legal obligation resulting from an act done within
the territory over which it has "jurisdiction", and that, if that sover-
eign does create such an obligation, that obligation accompanies the
person of the defendant everywhere. 79
71. Memorandum and Order at 12, McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., No. 85 Civ. 2983
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 1986).
72. 102 Cal. App. 3d 795, 802 (1980).
73. Bing v. Halstead, 495 F. Supp. 517, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
74. I.
75. 233 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1956), cert denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956). The court in In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Lit., 580 F. Supp. 690, 708 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), refers to Walton as
a "widely criticized" opinion.
76. The reasoning is discussed in E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWs 412-13
(1982); W. RESE & M. ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 384-91 (7th ed. 1978).
77. Walton, 233 F.2d at 542 (citing Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, 266 N.Y. 244,
248, 194 N.E. 692, 694 (1935)). This choice of law rule was also the federal rule. See, eg.,
Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R, 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
78. Walton, 233 F.2d at 542-43.
79. Id. at 543 n.2 (citing Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542; Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 224 N.Y. 99). For criticism of this view, see W. CooK, THE LoGi-
CAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAW 7, 311 (1942); Dodd, The Power of the
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In addition to positing rationale for the application of the lex loci
approach to a dispute between United States citizens in Saudi Arabia, the
Walton court addressed, in dicta, the concern that is the essential di.
lemma addressed in this Note:
It has been suggested that, where suit is brought in an American
court by an American plaintiff against an American defendant, com-
plaining of alleged tortious conduct by the defendant in a foreign coun-
try, and that conduct is tortious according to the rules of the forum,
the court, in some circumstances, should apply the forum's tort
rules.... Morris decries, as "mechanical jurisprudence," the invariable
reference to the "law" of the place where the alleged tort hap-
pened.... There may be much to Morris' suggestion; and a court-
particularly with reference to torts, where conduct in reliance on
precedents is ordinarily absent-should not perpetuate a doctrine
which, upon re-examination, shows up as unwise and unjust.80
The Walton court recognized the merit in giving consideration to alterna-
tives to the lex loci approach and acknowledged that:
[I]t might perhaps be appropriate to suggest that the Supreme Court
should reconsider the accepted doctrine (as to the complete dominance
of the "law" of the place where the alleged tort occurred) which seems
to have been unduly influenced by notions of sovereignty ? la Hobbes
.. as to the reification of the "notion of power."81
The Walton court, however, was unable to do more than relegate its dis-
cussion of the merits of the lex loci approach to a fbotnote because that
was then the test followed by the New York courts. The court was con-
strained by the well-established rule that a federal court sitting in diver-
sity must follow the substantive law of the state in which it sits, including
the state's choice of law rules.8 2
Some courts have departed from the mechanical rule followed in
Walton and have concurred with the Second Restatement that a more
sophisticated analysis is appropriate to resolve the choice of law question
in a tort case. For example, the court in Harding v. Arabian American
Oil Company upheld the plaintiffs' right to proceed under the tort law of
either Texas or California for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional
Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 HARV. L. Riv.
533, 536-37 (1926). For a different view, see Judge Learned Hand's opinions in Guiness v.
Miller, 291 F. 768, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States
Steel Corp., 300 F. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
80. Walton, 233 F.2d at 543 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 543 n.5.
82. Id. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
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distress, and other torts alleged to have occurred in Saudi Arabia."3
The Harding court followed California's governmental interest
test84 to determine which jurisdiction's tort law would apply. The court
noted that there were three possible jurisdictions whose laws conceivably
could apply in the case: California, because the suit was brought and the
plaintiffs were residents there; Texas, because Texas law was to control
the construction of the employment contract; and Saudi Arabia, because
performance of the contract occurred there.85
In making its decision, the court stated that it was "at a loss to
determine what interest Saudi Arabia ha[d] in enforcing its law of fraud
and damages over Aramco and the Plaintiffs."86 The court emphasized
that neither of the former enclave residents suing as plaintiffs was a citi-
zen of Saudi Arabia. John Harding, an American citizen, had been em-
ployed by Aramco and Patricia Harding, an Italian citizen, had moved to
Saudi Arabia to be with her husband and their children in what the court
described as "a western style" city run by Aramco and "insulated from
many Saudi Arabian laws and customs."87 The court addressed the in-
terest of Saudi Arabia in having its law apply to the plaintiffs. The court
focused on the question independently for each individual concluding
that "Saudi Arabia's interest in applying its law to Patricia seems very
tenuous to this Court.... [I]n regard to John, the interest of Saudi Ara-
bia in regulating Aramco's relations with its employees is very weak." 88
As a result, each party was allowed to look to Western tort law for
adjudication of claims against Aramco. This treatment indicates that
although the existence of a former employment relationship can be of key
importance in the choice of tort law analysis, its presence or absence
must not prove dispositive of the conflicts question. The cause of action
itself is based in tort rather than in contract.
The court devoted considerable discussion to the role of the employ-
ment contract in application of the governmental interest analysis. It
found that the employment relationship was actually centered in
America, even though all work was performed in Saudi Arabia, because
the standard Aramco employment application was returnable on its face
to Houston and Aramco's employees were processed and paid through
83. Memorandum in Support of Choice of Law Order at 12, Harding v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., No. 80-3847 (C.D. Cal. March 25, 1985).
84. See supra notes 47-56, and accompanying text.
85. Memorandum in Support of Choice of Law Order at 9, Harding, No. 80-3847.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 13.
88. Id
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Houston in United States dollars rather than in the currency of Saudi
Arabia. 9 Aramco classified employees as "expatriates," adjusted their
salaries on the basis of their "expatriate" status, and referred to their
moves back to the United States as "repatriation." These facts led the
court to reject the defendant's argument that Saudi Arabia had any cog-
nizable interest in having its tort principles apply to the plaintiff's
contentions:
The Court finds that the Saudi Arabian government has no apparent
interest in protecting Aramco, a foreign corporation, from lawsuits
brought by non-Saudi Arabians and based on acts which occurred
either on land intentionally separated from the normal course of Saudi
Arabian life (Dhahran) or outside of Saudi Arabia altogether. The
Court will not apply Saudi Arabian law. 90
The court also noted that Aramco had engaged in conduct inconsis-
tent with its assertion that the plaintiffs should have expected that Saudi
Arabian law would govern the parties' relationship. The employment
application, which later became part of the employment contract be-
tween the parties, "expressly provided that Texas law was to govern the
contract, not Saudi Arabian law." 9' The court additionally noted that
the contract also provided that Texas worker's compensation law and its
limitations on liability were to control any work-related injuries sus-
tained by the plaintiffs, despite the fact that it was absolutely clear that
neither theplaintiff nor Aramco ever intended the plaintiff to work any-
where but Saudi Arabia.92 In summary, the court stated that:
The evidence is overwhelming that Aramco, with the assistance of
the government of Saudi Arabia, stations its expatriate employees in
Dhahran, a "western style" city intentionally created by Aramco to be
set apart and insulated from many Saudi Arabian laws and customs.
The court finds implausible the assertion that Saudi Arabia has any
governmental interest in having its law control relations between a for-
eign employer and its foreign employees who live in a city intentionally
set apart from and insulated from the mainstream of Saudi Arabian life
and laws.93
The Harding court thus provides a decision that serves as authority
for the argument that the reasonable expectations held by individuals in
89. Id. at 9.
90. Id. at 12-13.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Harding, No. 80-3847 (opinion); Taggart v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., No. 84-716, slip op.
at 6 n.1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 1985).
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these enclaves is an extremely important, if not determinative, factor in
this choice of law question. In explaining its decision, this court was not
concerned with the constraints imposed by the "reification of the notion
of power" to which the Walton court alluded as the possible basis of a
mechanical application of the lex loci approach.94 Indeed, the Harding
court clearly departed from this thinking; it unequivocally stated that,
given the unique nature of the enclaves, the assertion that Saudi Arabia
had any legitimate governmental interest in applying its laws to relations
between enclave residents and Aramco was "implausible."
In Levine v. Arabian American Oil Company,95 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York gave an opinion
that employed a distinctly different rationale and reached a conclusion
contrary to that of the Harding court. The plaintiffs' claims for damages
resulting from defendants' allegedly tortious conduct were dismissed be-
cause of the court's ruling on the choice of law question.96
The Levine court concluded that "every significant factor points to
Saudi Arabia as this case's center of gravity." 97 The court listed those
factors it considered significant. The alleged torts occurred in Saudi Ara-
bia. The plaintiffs were employed and present in Saudi Arabia at the
time the alleged torts took place. The individuals named as defendants
along with Aramco were three Saudi Arab nationals and a Filipino resi-
dent. The principle place of Aramco's business was Saudi Arabia. Based
on these factors, the court characterized the connection of any state in
the United States with the torts alleged as insignificant and "too tenuous
for their interest to have any weight." 98
The court summarily concluded that Texas had no connection with
the torts at issue. Unlike the Harding court, the court in Levine attached
no particular significance to the choice of law provision that Aramco
included in its employment contracts. The court stated that "[w]hile
Texas law may apply to the employment agreements between Aramco
and plaintiffs, resolution of the contract claim does not necessarily con-
94. See Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1951) (criticizing, inter
alia, Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); Morris, Torts in the Conflict of Laws,
12 MODERN L. REV. 248 (1949). Cf G. STUMBERG, CONFLIcT OF LAvS § 201 (1951).
95. Levine v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., No. 84 Civ. 2396 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1985)
(WESTLAW, Federal library, Allfeds file).
96. Id
97. Id, slip op. at 16.
98. Id The Levine court cites Bing v. Halstead, 495 F. Supp. 517, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(fact that plaintiff was a New York domiciliary did not call for the application of New York
law when plaintiff was "a long time resident of another jurisdiction"); Cooperman v. Sunmark
Indus., 529 F. Supp. 365, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Carter, J.) ("long-term employment" of New
York plaintiff in New Jersey was a factor warranting application of New Jersey law).
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trol the question whether plaintiffs' tort claims are also governed by
Texas law." 99
The court found that Texas was precluded from asserting any legiti-
mate interest in having its law applied to the case because the plaintiffs
were not domiciled in Texas at the time of the alleged tort and Aramco's
co-defendants were not United States citizens." ° The court reasoned as
follows:
Since all the elements constituting the alleged torts occurred
within Saudi Arabia's borders, Saudi Arabia has a strong interest in
regulating and determining standards for liability. in Babcock,... the
court recognized that when the rightness or wrongness of the defend-
ant's conduct is at issue, as it is here, rather than the extent of liability,
it is appropriate to look to the place of the tort so as to give effect to
that jurisdiction's interest in regulating conduct within its borders, and
it would be almost unthinkable to seek the applicable rule in the law of
some other place.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that under Saudi Arab law plaintiffs are
unable to state viable tort claims. Rather, plaintiffs contend that appli-
cation of Saudi Arab law is anachronistic and unfair when applied to
Americans raised in a different culture with different expectations, and
hence this court should refuse to apply Saudi Arab tort law to Ameri-
can employees working for American employers in that country. 10 1
The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs raised an issue of fair-
ness, but it refused to address the issue in light of the quantity of Saudi
Arabian contacts present. The rule respecting a strong governmental in-
terest in the determination of rightness or wrongness of defendants con-
duct was recited without apparent concern for any unique considerations
that might arise from its application to enclaves. The court ignored the
fact that these communities have been both officially and unofficially re-
moved from the rest of Saudi Arabian life for over half a century.1
0 2
The same line of reasoning was followed in McGhee v. Arabian
American Oil-Company, in which the court granted the defendants' mo-
99. Levine, No. 84 Civ. 2396, slip op. at 16 (citing Godbey v. Frank E. Basil, Inc., 603 F.
Supp. 775, 777 (D.D.C. 1985)).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 17 (citations omitted). The Levine court cites Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d
473, 483-84, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 751 (1963), and Bing v. Halstead, 495 F. Supp. 517, 520
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applicable substantive law was the place where the tort occurred, Costa
Rica, under whose law no justiciable claim in tort would be recognized for negligent or inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress resulting from a letter written in Arizona and sent to a
New York domiciliary residing in Costa Rica).
102. See argument in Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 12-13, Levine, No. 86-7041 (2d Cir.
1986).
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tion for partial summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs' tort
claims."°3 The court thus allowed the litigation to proceed only on the
contract causes of action that had arisen out of the former employment
relationship between the parties.
The McGhee court concluded that the reasoning in Levine con-
trolled the choice of law question." g The court observed that Saudi Ara-
bian law does not permit the recovery of money damages for the
infliction of emotional distress, fraud, defamation, and conversion, and
thus decided to grant Aramco's motion for summary judgment on the
plaintiffs' tort claims."05 Although the Levine court emphasized the fact
that the defendants included several Saudi Arabian nationals as key in its
decision to apply Saudi Arabian law, 0 6 the cases were not distinguished
by the McGhee court despite the absence of any foreign defendants."07
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Having set out the courts' various solutions to the conflicts question,
it is possible to review the opinions and their treatment of distinct factors
in arriving at those solutions. This section is divided into subsections,
discussing the factors identified by section 6 of the Second Restatement
of Conflict of Laws and the Agent Orange court as generally necessary in
the determination of any conflicts issue.
A. The Protection of Justified Expectations
The positions adopted in Walton and Harding are directly opposed
with respect to the significance of individuals' perceptions of the source
and character of respective rights and responsibilities. In the context of
an enclave of expatriates in Saudi Arabia, expectations of recourse to a
certain body of law (that is, Western common law as opposed to the
Islamic Shari'a) for the resolution of conflicts should be a crucial factor
in the determination of the choice of law question.
In the particular personal injury case before the Walton court, the
plaintiff may have failed to develop any expectations relevant to the dis-
pute before he was hit by the corporation's truck. Nonetheless, in other
tort cases, an individual's expectations may not only be vitally relevant,
but their consideration may also be necessary to a just adjudication.
103. Memorandum and Order at 14, McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., No. 85 Civ. 2983
(N.D. Cal. order entered Apr. 11, 1986).
104: Id. at 13.
105. Id. at 13-14.
106. Levine, No. 84 Civ. 2396, slip op. at 16 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1985).
107. See Memorandum and Order at 1-2, McGhee, No. 85 Civ. 2983.
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If expatriates are living in an enclave established by their employer,
they should be able to maintain a reasonable expectation that if a tort
takes place, the responsible, party must answer for that tortious conduct.
There is currently an enormous increase in litigation in the United States
arising out of allegations of employment-related slander and libel. One-
third of all slander and libel verdicts are decisions in cases targeting em-
ployers.'10 As many as eight thousand such suits may have been filed in
the past five years.' 09 Verdicts have run heavily in favor of the employ-
ees with awards going as high as two million dollars.'10 Individuals
hired in the United States by a United States corporation and placed in
an environment separated from the heart of the local culture reasonably
could, and probably will, believe that the basic common law protections
of reputation, property, and person familiar to them will apply in the
overseas enclave.
The court in Harding found that Aramco created expectations that
American law would apply in the enclaves. Arameo was found to have
created these expectations, in part, through its efforts to secure the bene-
fits of American law for matters arising out of the employment contract.
Aramco also actively engages in the practice of generating these expecta-
tions through the use of advertisements in recruiting potential employees.
These solicitations frequently employ rhetorical strategies that emphasize
elements of life familiar to American culture such as little league and
golf. The enclaves are portrayed as "little pieces of America" in corpo-
rate recruitment and employee relations literature. The following is an
example of the full-page advertisements picturing golf games, little league
teams, and Cub Scouts which Aramco has placed in leading national
publications:
Important talks in the Middle East-Statesmen aren't the only
people in the Middle East who have important talks. In Saudi Arabia,
where we live, Cub Scouts have important talks with Den Mothers.
Car owners have important talks with mechanics. Batters have them
with umpires. And schoolgirls have lots of them with other
schoolgirls.
We're Aramco, the Arabian American Oil Company. There are
13,000 North Americans in Saudi Arabia with us. And even though
you hear a lot of news about Saudi Arabia, there are things that might
108. Copeland, The Revenge of the Fired, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16,1987, at 46 (quoting statis-
tics from Jury Verdict Research, Inc.).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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surprise you about our lives here."'1
The unfortunate irony is that the surprise described in this adver-
tisement refers to the extreme similarity of life in Saudi Arabia to that in
America. The real surprise in store for the expatriates, however, lies in a
defendant's asserting, and an American court's accepting, the idea that
the Shari'a is the sole source of law governing conduct in the enclaves.
The expectations of an American lifestyle in Saudi Arabia are no acci-
dent. A corporation like Aramco cultivates such expectations as an es-
sential element of recruitment. Any description of the expatriates'
perception of the nature of life in these enclaves must devote serious con-
sideration to the representations made by such corporations.
B. Relevant Policies and Interests of the Other States: The Needs
of the Interstate and International Systems
Refusal to recognize specific conduct as a basis for imposing civil
liability in a country does not necessarily mean that such conduct is con-
doned in that society. The role of tort liability and recourse to private
civil litigation in regulating conduct is significantly greater in the United
States than in countries where a more unified church and state assume a
proportionately greater role in serving that end.
Neither society's interest is served when defendants escape the sanc-
tions of Western civil liability and the law, such as the Shari'a, is deemed
controlling on the issue. The defendants are not subjected to civil liabil-
ity under the principles of such a body of law. Because they may be
corporate entities or repatriated natural persons, these defendants may
effectively be immune from the traditional nonlegal religious and polit-
ical means of regulating conduct in these countries. A host country's
commitment to emphasizing individual accountability through following
a policy such as nonrecognition of vicarious liability is in no way fur-
thered by allowing a corporation to avoid answering for the acts of its
agents. The policy simply predates the origination of the corporate per-
son as a legal entity.
Litigation is not employed in the sanctioning or restriction of con-
duct by these societies. There is simply no general theory of recovery for
injury and no notion of the obligation to compensate for loss proximately
111. Copies of typical Aramco ads used in the 1980s were made available to the Levine
court. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 20 n. 11, Levine v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., No. 86-
7041 (2d Cir. Apr. 9, 1986) (WESTLAW, Federal library, Allteds file) (quoting Aramco adver-
tisement, which appeared 1981-1985 in such periodicals as Outdoor Life, Sports Illustrated.
National Geographic, Time, Newsweek Oil & Gas Journal, Computervorld, and Wall Street
Journal).
19871
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
caused; instead, in many of these jurisdictions, a handful of specific cir-
cumstances entitle a private party to obtain relief against another private
party. The power of the faith and the state to establish and enforce the
code of conduct in such a country is strong.' 12 This power may be set in
some perspective by viewing it against what may be its cultural antithe-
sis-the hyperlitigious nature of American culture. In the American
scheme, norms and edicts that control conduct are issued by the courts,
and then only in response to demands from individuals who are meeting
as adversaries using what they feel is a fundamental right of access to a
neutral forum.
The Harding court recognized the significant role that official corpo-
rate policy regarding the standards of conduct and the nature of rights
existent in the enclaves should play in the analysis of choice of tort law.
The corporations have received authority from the government to estab-
lish policy within the boundaries of the enclave. This authority is signifi-
cant both as it exists in reality in the relationship between a corporation
and a sovereign and as it is understood by employees. Belief in this au-
thority gives the communications from their employers meaning and
relevance.
The government of the host country frequently explicitly grants au-
thority to the corporations to set down rules within the enclaves. For
example, the Concession Agreement of 1933 provides that the company
Aramco has the exclusive right for a sixty-year period to explore for,
extract, and export petroleum from eastern Saudi Arabia and to use "all
means and facilities it may deem necessary or advisable to carry out the
purposes of this enterprise including, among other things, the right to
construct and use roads, structures and all systems of communication...
in connection with the camps, buildings and quarters of the personnel of
the company."' 1 3 It is pursuant to this Concession Agreement that
Aramco obtained certain land in Saudi Arabia and set up Western style
towns. The American residents "have always been exempt, within the
compounds, from the religious laws of Saudi Arabia. The exemption was
never spelled out in writing. Rather it was orally approved by the king
and communicated to Aramco's original chairman." '14
The corporation's limited ability to declare policy quasi-indepen-
112. For an extensive discussion of this power, see V.S. NAIPAUL, AMONG THE BELIllV-
ERS: AN ISLAMIC JOURNEY (1981).
113. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment at 4 n.2, Levine, No. 84 Civ. 2396 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing Concessions Agreement of
1933 arts. 1, 2, 22).
114. Id. at 4.
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dently of the sovereign is also demonstrated implicitly. In allowing the
existence of the enclaves and corporate operations within its territory,
the host country can be seen as having exchanged untrammelled sover-
eignty for a slightly compromised sovereignty with the benefit of eco-
nomic utility-a quid pro quo.
The following scholarly description offers analysis that lends sup-
port to the theory of a quid pro quo arrangement:
Interestingly enough, [the Saudi Arabians] also reveal a quasi-capitula-
tions system whereby the United States military and Corps of Engi-
neers personnel are subject only nominally to Saudi laws. This
concession of sovereignty may be acceptable to the Saudis as a neces-
sity to induce American assistance in developing areas critical to their
national security; the bypassing of national laws is thus an expedient in
their long-term national interests. The same reasoning may be opera-
tive in their unwillingness to punish foreigners, particularly Wes-
terners, who have violated the law. In short, Saudi Arabia: 1) not
only accepts in treaties its international responsibility to protect aliens,
but it also argues that it does so equally; 2) nowhere promises aliens
equality before the law with its citizens but it does require them to
obey its laws; and 3) allows unequal treatment of certain foreigners
whose legal status is better than that accorded other aliens because
they are necessary for developmental purposes, and overlooks the local
rule requirement in the case of other foreigners for fear of offiending
their government.' 15
It seems that the Walton, Levine, and McGhee courts would not ac-
cept this quid pro quo analysis. They placed paramount significance on
the interest of the host county in declaring the rights and responsibilities
operative in all territory within its jurisdiction. The mechanical jurispru-
dence decried in the treatise cited over thirty years ago in Walton per-
sists, despite that treatise's admonition against perpetuating "a doctrine
which, upon re-examination, shows up as unwise and unjust."' 16
Nonetheless, courts like Harding have recognized that a compro-
mise of absolute sovereignty transpires when a host country allows a cor-
poration and its employees to engage in conduct that normally would be
forbidden in that jurisdiction. To accrue the economic benefits that the
foreign corporation's presence generates, Saudi Arabia provides an envi-
ronment for the corporation and its employees that is conducive to a
sustained presence. Finally, Saudi Arabia has historically demonstrated
115. J.P. Piscatori, Islam and the International Order: The Case of Saudi Arabia 357 (May
1986) (unpublished dissertation).
116. Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1956).
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little interest in applying its law to disputes between foreigners who, as
nonbelievers, are in principle strangers to its Muslim judges.' 1 7
In addition to the difficulty inherent in any attempt to ascertain the
content of foreign law, it is important to remember that codified law and
policy statements often fail to reflect accurately unwritten but existent
economic policies. These policies often diametrically oppose stated reli-
gious and cultural objectives. Thus, the policy of a foreign jurisdiction
that a United States court might be able to discover may not be the pol-
icy that is truly controlling in the host country itself.
C. Relevant Policies of the Forum
The Harding court recognized the significance of the United States'
interest in declaring and enforcing the rights and duties of its citizens to
one another, regardless of those natural or corporate persons' geographic
location at any particular point in time. Such an opinion appreciates a
phenomenon significant to United States culture: modem international
corporations' use of discrete communities to accommodate expatriates in
a particular country.
The majority of modem commercial transactions possess an interna-
tional quality. Developments in transportation and communication have
resulted in an increasingly mobile work force. Combined with the degree
of accident involved in determining the locations in which American
businesses operate, this leads to a high probability of a United States
corporation using United States citizens as employees in a country with
vastly different tort law than the United States.
Courts should take notice that corporations such as Aramco use
United States publications to lead individuals to believe that American
standards will apply to its conduct. The United States has a strong con-
cem for fraud perpetrated on the American public." 8 America also has
a strong interest in the conduct of its citizens in foreign countries, partic-
ularly when intentionally tortious conduct is alleged." 9 This interest is
relevant whenever the conduct of an American corporate or natural per-
son is at issue. A policy of accountability is frustrated by decisions that
apply the tort law of the host country and thus resolve liability questions
in favor of the defendant.
117. MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE, LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST 338 (1955) (discussing
whether national courts may assume jurisdiction in civil suits involving only foreigners, con.
sidering the Islamic court's discretion to refuse jurisdiction to nonbelievers).
118. Cf. Lieb v. American Motors Corp., 538 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y, 1982).
119. London Film Prod. Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 47,
49 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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D. Basic Policies Underlying the Particular Field of Law
Despite the difficult comity concerns involved, it is necessary to de-
velop a policy to provide enclave residents with a tort system more at-
tuned to their expectations and needs. A United States court faces
appreciable difficulty in attempting to apply rules modeled after the solu-
tions to domestic conflict of law questions to the inapposite situation of a
conflict between a particular state's form of Western common law tort
principles and the sacred and monarchial principles of Islamic law in
Saudi Arabia. Provided that the forum has some interest in the litigation
apart from the fact that it is the forum, a court should look to whether its
decision on the conflicts question furthers or frustrates the policies un-
derlying Western tort law. 2 In Harding, the court presumed that "Cal-
ifornia has a governmental interest in giving its residents a forum in
which to vindicate torts which California recognizes." ' The policies
favoring an individual's ability to ascertain the law and the protection of
such individual interests as reputation are frustrated when a court opts
for the application of tort principles of the Islamic Shari'a.
E. Certainty, Predictability, and Uniformity of Result: Ease in the
Determination and Application of the Law to Be Applied
Finally, a problem is presented by Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 122 and
later cases that include a forum's choice of law rules as part of the sub-
stantive law of the state in which a federal court is sitting.12 Because a
federal court sitting in diversity is constrained to look to the substantive
law of the state in which it sits, a lack of uniformity in choice of law
resolution will be inevitable in the United States so long as jurisdictions
employ different tests. This lack of uniformity will give rise to the con-
comitant ills of inequitable administration of justice and forum shopping.
Consistent adoption of a policy like that employed in either Harding or
section 6 of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws would bring an
end to the uncertainty and eliminate the preemption of disposition of
genuine disputes.
Concededly, adoption of a balancing test would mean that courts
must employ some analysis in deciding which jurisdiction's law to apply.
However, in a situation in which the the court decides to apply American
120. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
121. Memorandum in Support of Choice of Law Order at 7-9, 12, Harding v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., No. 80-3847 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1985).
122. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
123. Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challover, 423 U.S. 3 (1975); Klaxon v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 303 U.S. 487 (1941).
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law, the loss of ease involved in giving up a de facto lex loci rule is incon-
sequential in comparison to the accessability to the courts gained by
adoption of a balancing test.
VI. CONCLUSION
Employers with foreign operations benefit from initially having
made definite representations that life would be governed by one set of
standards. The same employers subsequently benefit from the argument
that operative legal standards are determined wholly by strict application
of the laws of the jurisdiction in which the events transpired. The bene-
fits of the initial position include the ability to solicit future employees
and secure the benefits of law favorable to the employer to govern all
claims arising out of the contracts for foreign employment. The benefits
of the latter position become apparent once litigation has ensued and it is
understood that the conduct would not be tortious under the substantive
law of the jurisdiction in which the events transpired, while it would be
tortious according to the law of the forum. Courts are accepting this
self-preserving sophistry when they grant motions for summary judg-
ment on the basis of the confficts analysis together with official descrip-
tions of the jurisdiction's substantive tort law principles.
The jurisdiction in which the enclave is located has only a slight
interest in having its law apply to the transactions between the enclaves'
occupants. Litigation generally takes place upon repatriation and, there-
fore, there is no significant impact on the host country from recognizing
a right of recovery in the United States in a situation in which the host
country would deny recovery. Next to the interests of the individual liti-
gant in seeking redress and the interest of a country in seeing that all its
citizens have meaningful access to the law, concern with pure exercise of
sovereignty dims in significance. To the extent that legitimate issues of
sovereignty remain, it must be determined to what degree the exercise of
sovereignty has been restricted by previous compromise and exchange.
Even then, a court should ask how well the interest of the foreign juris-
diction would be served by handing down a decision that effectively al-
lows defendants to engage in tortious conduct without fear of adverse
consequences.
In failing to apply Western tort law to a dispute arising within these
enclaves, a court fails to meet its obligation of providing citizens within
its jurisdiction with a forum for the resolution of legitimate disputes.
Such a court also fails to meet its obligation to set down rulings that
discourage future misconduct by others within its jurisdiction. Perhaps
(Vol, I1I
1987] Choice of Tort Law 103
this amounts to a failure to recognize the implications of the interna-
tional quality of the modem business world. In any event, this amounts
to a failure to recognize the seemingly reasonable contention that an
American living temporarily abroad with other Americans and working
for a United States corporation has a right to expect that American law
will apply in any disputes that occur with those Americans.

